framework for dealing with overlapping claims and in fact leaves the states to work out the disputes themselves. 8 In addition, not all of the Arctic states are signatories to the convention, which means that they are outside the scope of the Convention for all purposes. 9 Because of the ineffective manner in which UNCLOS provides dispute resolution for the Arctic states, the states should consider negotiating a mutually beneficial agreement amongst them that is outside UNCLOS. This would require the cooperation of all of the Arctic states that have potential interests.' 0 This Note will provide information regarding the issues between the five Arctic states; analyze solutions that have already been proposed to solve the territorial disputes in the Arctic; and evaluate prior territorial disputes to determine if a viable solution can be derived. This Note will conclude with what the author believes to be the most practicable solution to the problem of overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic: the Arctic states need to cooperate with each other and should consider negotiating a mutually beneficial agreement outside the sphere of UNCLOS that will resolve current disputes and provide a framework for analyzing future claims.
Part I will introduce the issues affecting the Arctic states, provide an overview of the changing climate conditions in the Arctic, and detail the resources that may become available as Arctic ice melts further." Part II will address the legal framework that currently governs the Arctic, including the background and history of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 and the Convention's application to the Arctic.'
3 Part II will also examine why the United States is not a party to the Convention 14 and explain the ineffectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms in UNCLOS in relation to the Arctic.I 5 Part III will discuss the current disputes over areas of the Arctic, including the dispute over the Northwest Passage, 16 Russia's claims against the other Arctic states, 17 and the dispute over Hans Island (between Denmark and Canada).' 8 Part IV analyzes previously proposed models of solutions for the Arctic, including the Antarctica Model, 19 an environmental model, 20 and the model that would result if all the Arctic states were to ratify UNCLOS. 2 1 Part and the Australia and East Timor maritime boundary dispute. 23 Finally, Part VI will offer conclusions and recommendations regarding the most practical solutions for the Arctic states in order to mitigate potential future disputes, including the cooperation of the Arctic states and the possibility of negotiating a mutually beneficial agreement among the Arctic states outside of UNCLOS. 24 
B. Overview ofArctic Climate Change
The current and potential future territorial disputes in the Arctic center around the recent drastic change in the Arctic climate. In 2007, the Arctic ice cap's loss through melting was ten times the recent annual average. 25 "Over all, the floating ice dwindled to an extent unparalleled in a century or more .... 26 The summer of 2007 was the first time in recorded history that the Northwest Passage was completely free of ice. 27 Some experts predict that the ice retreats will continue to expand because the winter freeze is beginning from an enormous ice deficit. 28 "At least one researcher ... projects a blue Arctic Ocean in the summers by 2013. " 29 However, there are experts who do not believe that the warming of the Arctic merits concern. 30 It is unclear what share of the recent thawing can be "attributed to natural cycles and how much to [ In addition, Drake Bennett notes that fifty-five million years ago the average temperature in the Arctic was in the mid-70s and there were palm trees, crocodiles, and mosquitoes present. Drake Bennett While scientists disagree about the forces behind the Arctic melt, currently, the ice is nevertheless steadily melting. 32 Any amount of ice that melts results in an exponential loss of additional ice. 33 This is because ice reflects most of the solar energy of the sun, striking it back into space so that it does not warm the oceans. 34 Instead of reflecting solar energy, water absorbs most of the solar energy of the sun, which results in an increase of water temperature. 35 As a result, each area of ocean exposed by melting ice soaks up more heat, which melts more ice, which exposes more sea, which soaks up even more heat, etc., until there is no more ice left to melt.
36
A warmer Arctic region would have many additional environmental effects. 3 1 "Since more than half of the Arctic region consists of oceans, climatic variations will have a large impact on marine environments and marine-related activity., 38 Such impacts could potentially include elevated sea levels; changes in ocean salinity, which could strongly affect regional climate; and the decline or extinction of marine species due to habitat loss.
39

C. Available Resources Uncovered by the Melt
As the Arctic ice melts, many resources will become available. 40 The resources were not accessible prior to the melting ice because it was logistically difficult or impossible to reach them. 169, 182 (2008) . This is because sea ice is an integral part of the polar bears' habitat and when the increasing global temperatures cause the sea ice to recede, the polar bears' habitat is compromised. Id. The relationship between the polar bears and sea ice is one of dependence: the sea ice (1) serves as a place on which the polar bears can hunt and eat; (2) allows them to travel to other areas for maternity denning; and (3) serves as a location for such denning. have to deal with subzero temperatures, marauding ice floes [sic], violent seas, and the logistical difficulties that come with transporting oil and gas from remote, often offshore locations. ' '42 The most sought-after resource in the Arctic is the potential oil and gas reserves that are predicted to lie under the ocean floor. 43 According to the United States Geological Survey, the region may contain 25% of the world's remaining oil and gas reserves. 44 The resources that will become accessible are estimated to be worth trillions of dollars. 45 Russia estimates the value of the potential minerals in its Arctic claim to be around $2 trillion. 46 A conservative estimate values the oil, gas, and other resources in the area that the United States could claim at $1.3 trillion. 4 7 In addition to oil and gas reserves, the polar thaw will also begin to unlock new cruise ship destinations and important commercial fisheries. 48 The melting of the Arctic ice will also open up various new shipping routes, the most important being the Northwest Passage. 49 The Northwest Passage connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and continues through the remote islands of Canada's northern archipelago. 50 The passage could reduce the sea-route for cargo from Europe to Asia by about 4,000 miles. 5 '
Although the melting of Arctic ice significantly improves access to previously unobtainable resources, other characteristics unique to the Arctic will continue to make resource extraction challenging: 
Id.
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darkness, [and] remoteness make work extremely difficult and demanding and lead to high capital costs; the lack of infrastructure requires additional investment; offshore operations face additional threats such as damage of the equipment by sea ice or icebergs, which need extra precautionary measures; [and] long risky transport routes narrow the profit margin for operations in the Arctic. The area of the Arctic at issue is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Convention is the product of ongoing international negotiations that began in 1930.5 3 Currently, the Convention has many intricate Articles that relate to the dispute between the Arctic states; however, the Convention does not adequately resolve potential disputes in the Arctic and has been a source of criticism among many scholars who question its effectiveness. 5 4 In addition, not all of the Arctic states that could potentially be involved in territorial disputes are parties to the Convention, which also has consequences with regard to Arctic disputes. 5 5
A. Background/History of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Beginning in the seventeenth century, oceans had long been subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine; the principle essentially limited national rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation's coast.
5 6 The remainder of the sea was proclaimed to be "free to all and belonging to none." 57 By the 1960s, the oceans were being exploited as never before and were generating a multitude of claims and sovereignty disputes. 8 
B. UNCLOS Application to the Arctic
Under UNCLOS, every nation is entitled to an exclusive economic zone up to 200 miles from its shoreline. 64 However, the rules governing territorial claims beyond 200 miles of the shoreline remain controversial and ineffective. 65 The most significant aspect of UNCLOS's application to the Arctic is Article 76 which codifies a legal definition of "continental shelf,, 66 Navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine resources, protection of the marine environment, a marine research regime and, a more unique feature, a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between States -these are among the important features of the treaty. 
Id.
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scientific and technical determinations of distance, geomorphology, and geology. 67 UNCLOS defines "continental shelf' as "comprising the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin's outer edge. 68 If that natural prolongation falls short of 200 nautical miles from the baselines, the legal continental shelf is regarded as continuing 200 nautical miles from the baselines. 69 If the natural prolongation exceeds 200 nautical miles from the baselines, the coastal state's legal continental shelf continues until the natural prolongation ends, but under no circumstances may the continental shelf exceed either: (1) 350 nautical miles from the baselines or (2) 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath. 7°T he Arctic states have considerable interest in extending their claims beyond the 200 nautical miles because, under UNCLOS, they have the right to exploration and exploitation of the natural resources contained in the extended territory. 7 ' Under Article 77 of UNCLOS, coastal states exercise sobering rights over their continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 72 The right is exclusive "in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without express consent of the coastal state. 73 The resources that Article 77 refers to are "mineral and other nonliving resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species .... This definition clearly includes oil and gas reserves, which are a major economic interest to the Arctic states. 75 Thus, in order for the Arctic states to maximize the area that they are entitled to explore and exploit, they must make submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that would extend their continental is the part of the seabed adjacent to the continent forming a large submerged terrace that dips gently seaward. The second, called the continental slope, drops away more steeply from the shelf into greater depth. It extends from the shelf edge to the top of the continental rise, or to the top of the deep ocean floor where no rise exists. The third, the continental rise (where it exists), lies beyond the slope and again falls away more gradually to the deep ocean floor. The shelf and the slope normally have geological characteristics typical of continental crust, often overlain by thick layers of sedimentary rock, the sediments having been washed down from the continent.... The three sections together are commonly known as the continental margin, but are referred to in UNCLOS also as the continental shelf. [Vol. 19:2 MELTING ICE CAUSING THE ARCTIC TO BoIL OVER shelf to the maximum limit permitted. 76 In order to claim territory beyond the 200 mile area that every nation is entitled to, states must engage in a delineation process. 77 There are three stages of the delineation process: submission preparation, review by CLCS, 78 and delineation deposit. 79 During the submission preparation phase, states must acquire and interpret data before a submission can be prepared for review. 0 After submission, CLCS is "to consider, make recommendations, and provide requested scientific and technical advice regarding coastal States' continental shelf submissions on the basis of its Scientific and Technical Guidelines and Rules of Procedure. 8 1 CLCS will then review the information and make a recommendation to the coastal state regarding the delineation of the continental shelf 8 2 "If the coastal state establishes its continental shelf on the basis of those recommendations, then the recommendations are 'final and binding. ', 8 3 Article 76 also establishes the CLCS, 84 which is made up of twenty-one individuals. 8 mechanisms engaged in corrective or punitive measures when international commitments are not satisfied. 8 9 CLCS is a science-based body composed of members who are "experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography." 90 In fact, none of the CLCS members have any legal training. 91 The decision to rely on science was intended to depoliticize delineation; however, the process is still dependent on the biases of the scientists involved. 92 The fact that CLCS lacks legal expertise has been subject to some criticism. 93 However, this fact is mitigated because the Commission can ask the Legal Counsel of the United Nations for legal advice. 94 [T]he primary competence to interpret Article 76 must rest with the UNCLOS State Parties, the view has been expressed that the Commission should in general accept the interpretation made by the submitting coastal State; and that only if the Commission considers that that interpretation departs from what can reasonably be considered to be in accordance with the Convention should it reject it. 95 It is very difficult to determine the effectiveness of CLCS in the delineation process because the method of formulating recommendations is obscure. CLCS sessions are closed to all parties except the state whose submission is being evaluated. 96 CLCS is bound by states' requests to keep their submission information confidential. 97 This results in a lack of details of the CLCS's deliberations. 9 8 CLCS also refuses to consider interventions from states that are not opposite from or adjacent to the submitting state. 99 . "These policies only make it more difficult for other States to contribute to and learn from others' submissions about how the best science should be brought to bear in support of different types of claims." Prows, supra note 61, at 276.
[Vol. 19:2 more practice and transparency, it is similarly difficult to assess the efficiency of the CLCS in interpreting and applying international law."' l Article 76(4) provides the methods for calculating the outer edge of the continental margin, which includes two alternate formulas.' 0 ' Article 76(4) provides that:
4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either:
(i) a line delineated.., by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 percent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental shelf; or (ii) a line delineated ... by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope.
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.1 0 2
The Irish formula, contained in Article 76(4)(i), places the outer limits out to a point where hydrocarbon-rich sedimentary rocks have settled down the continental margin in detectable thickness.
1 0 3 The Hedberg formula, contained in Article 76(4)(ii), calculates the outer limit as sixty miles from the foot of the continental slope, "which itself is an estimate of where the land mass begins its rise from the deep ocean floor." 1 4 The maximum width for the extended continental shelf under either formula is 350 miles from shore, or for non-ridge claims, 100 miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath.' 0 5
When the continental shelf extends past 200 nautical miles, the coastal state is supposed to delineate the outer limits of the continental shelf.'0 6 The Convention requires that no later than ten years after a coastal state becomes a Article 76 is implemented."' 0 9 The full Article 76 mechanism has yet to be tested by any state that has deposited its final and binding delineation with the United Nations Secretary-General, or by exercising its jurisdiction in a claimed extended continental shelf area."o There are also many uncertain situations created by Article 76 that remain to be determined. 1 ' Conflict over the uncertain situations has the potential to "fragment and undermine the whole continental shelf outer limit regime." ' " 12 Another point of contention regarding Article 76 comes during the "final and binding" continental shelf outer limit delineation on the basis of CLCS's recommendations.
13 No state has deposited its CLCS delineation with the United Nations Secretary-General, so it is difficult to evaluate the success of Article 76.' 14 "It is foreseeable... that conflict could arise where a coastal State and its opposite, adjacent, and distant-water colleagues disagree over whether the delineation is appropriately based on the CLCS recommendations and thus undoubtedly 'final and binding. There are several problems with the method of delineation of territory set out in Article 76 of UNCLOS. First, the Arctic region is a very unique place; it is the only place in the world where a number of countries form a circle around an enclosed ocean." 6 This means that there is a lot of overlap in territorial claims.'
17 The overlap is of particular concern because CLCS is prohibited from making recommendations regarding territory that is claimed by more than one state. 118 The states with competing claims are supposed to work it out amongst themselves. 119 The second problem with the method is that ocean mapping systems are not very accurate.
120 "Overall, maps of Mars are about 250 times better than maps of the earth's ocean floor." 1 2 ' This also contributes to competing claims, as it is difficult for a state to determine the precise delineation of the continental shelf without accurate data. 1 22 "The critical task of delineating a true outer limit to the continental shelf is now a matter of implementing the delicate balance between applied science and supervised unilateral claims embodied in Article 76 of UNCLOS.' 2 3
Thus, while UNCLOS appeared to be an ideal method of governing the world's oceans at the time of its adoption, there are many problems with it regarding Arctic territory claims. 124 The uncertainty of Article 76 regarding claims to the Arctic is of particular importance. The uncertainty of UNCLOS may lead to additional disputes over Arctic territory. Therefore, "[a]lthough UNCLOS as a political bargain and legal regime may aspire to universality, it is undoubtedly an imperfect and incomplete instrument."' ' 25 116. King, supra note 86, at 335.
117.
Id. The boundaries of the five nations "converge the way sections of an orange meet at the stem." Krauss et al., supra note 3. 
Id.
123. Prows, supra note 61, at 241. "The stated scientific criteria --despite the attempt to make the criteria definitive-remain vague and ambiguous, in addition to suffering from the uncertainties inherent in any nascent scientific endeavor." Id. 
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subordinate to any country claiming competing territory, as CLCS will not evaluate the claims of states that are not parties to the treaty. 45 Senator Lugar has commented that CLCS will soon begin making decisions on claims to continental shelf areas that could impact the United States' own claims in the area and resources of our broad continental margin. Russia is already making excessive claims in the Arctic. Unless we are party to the Convention, we will not be able to protect our national interest in these discussions.
146
In response to the need for UNCLOS to be ratified, and the refusal of a few Senate members to present the treaty, some advocates have proposed that the President should "withdraw the treaty from the Senate and work with both Houses of Congress to foster a Congressional-Executive agreement .... ,,147 in a Congressional-Executive Agreement "the President, with the authorization or approval of Congress, may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the Constitution.', 48 Those who support a Congressional-Executive Agreement think that it would create "fresh political impetus to get the Convention approved."' 149 "The Convention powerfully serves our security interests and no United States oceans interest is better served by non-adherence.' ' 50 Even though the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, it is taking measures to ensure that if it ever ratifies the Convention its interests will be protected. In August 2007, the United States launched the $1 million Healy expedition to map the ocean floor of the Arctic.151 The Healy expedition is the United States' third seafloor mapping venture of the Arctic since 2003.152 "The Healy's voyage is part of a broader U.S. effort to extend its undersea zone of military and economic authority should it adopt the 25-year-old U.N. [Vol..! 9:2 MELTING ICE CAUSING THE ARCTIC To BOIL OVER Hence, in order for the United States to protect its interests in both the Arctic and other areas of the world's oceans, it is imperative that it become a signatory to UNCLOS. 5 4 Even in the event that the Arctic states attempt to negotiate an agreement outside of UNCLOS, becoming a signatory will be beneficial to the United States because it will be able to protect its interests in areas outside of the Arctic.
155
D. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Contained within UNCLOS
While UNCLOS contains provisions for dispute resolution under the Convention, the prescribed methods will likely be ineffective at quelling disputes in the Arctic. 156 Under Article 287 of UNCLOS, a party to the convention can choose, through a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning interpretation or application of the Convention: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; 57 the International Court of Justice; an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS; and/or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII 58 for one or more categories of disputes specified.1 59 If the parties to a dispute have selected the same procedure, they may only use that procedure, unless they agree otherwise.
160 If the parties to a dispute have not agreed upon the same procedure, the dispute may only be submitted to arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS.
1
The four Arctic states that are parties to UNCLOS have not all selected the same method for dispute resolution. 162 As a result, if Denmark or Norway were engaged in a dispute regarding UNCLOS Article 83 with a state that had not selected the same dispute mechanism under UNCLOS Article 287, instead of appearing before an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII, the dispute resolution would be pursuant to Article 298.172 Under UNCLOS Article 298, if the parties do not reach an agreement as to a method of dispute in a reasonable period of time, at the request of any of the parties the matter can be submitted to conciliation under UNCLOS Annex V, Section 2.173 In conciliation, a conciliation commission simply makes nonbinding proposals to the parties with a view of reaching an amicable settlement. 174 In addition, if Canada and Russia have a dispute with any state regarding delimitation of continental shelves under UNCLOS Article 83 they will also be subject to conciliation if they cannot reach an agreement in a reasonable amount of time. 
A. United States and Canada -The Northwest Passage
The melting of the Arctic ice has reignited a longstanding feud between Canada and the United States over who controls the Northwest Passage.' 83 The United States has long claimed that the Northwest Passage is an international strait through which it has transit passage. 84 The United States has "continually refus[ed] to acknowledge Canadian Sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago, and thus, the Northwest Passage."' 85 Canada claims that it has internal jurisdiction over the waterway. 186 The Canadian claim is founded on the International Court of Justice's decision in the Norwegian Fisheries Case.1 87 Canada's claims stem from the argument that the "straits composing the Northwest Passage amount to inland seas, and therefore are subject to Canadian sovereignty, just as the United States controls Lake Michigan. The United States replies that these straits are part of the high seas, and thus anyone can enter them without obtaining Canada's consent.' 8 8 The United States' claim is supported by the Corfu Channel case.' 8 9
While Canada may not have a valid argument that it has sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, it may be in the best interest of the rest of the world that it does, even if it will reap the greatest profit and have the formal power to keep the rest of the world out.19 0 "Canada has an interest in protecting the passage and exploiting its resources, which the rest of the world can purchase. [Vol. 19:2 MELTING ICE CAUSING THE ARCTIC TO BoIL OVER is because common areas of the ocean are subject to exploitation. 92 Overfishing has commonly been the predictable consequence of uncontrolled oceans.1 93 Common areas of the ocean are also subject to increased environmental harm, as there is no one nation that enforces environmental protection laws. 94 "If no one can control the oceans, then the problem cannot be solved by giving a country nominal title to them."' 95 However, many speculate that because of its military weakness, Canada cannot control the Northwest Passage without the support of the United States. 1 96 One proposal posits that if the United States supports Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage in return for some sort of guarantee of United States military and civilian access, the two countries may strengthen their claims against Russia.
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"As the world heats up, the two countries need to prepare themselves for the re-emergence of old rivalries, and in the battle over control of the Arctic, the U.S. and Canada are natural allies.' 98
B. Russia and all Other Arctic Nations
Russia is the Arctic nation that is most aggressively trying to claim as much Arctic territory as it can. 1 99 On August 2, 2007, two Russian submarines traveled over two miles under the Arctic Ocean and planted a titanium Russian flag on the seafloor of the North Pole, claiming the underwater territory for Russia. 2°° While the flag planting does not have any legal effect towards UNCLOS claims, it signaled Russia's seriousness regarding the Arctic territory.
Further, in spite of its legal insignificance, the Russian flagplanting mission generated backlash from most of the Arctic countries, especially Canada. 
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incident, "Russia's attempted grab is a cause for concern," and called on the United States government to "formulate a strong response. 20 5 Russia is the only Arctic nation thus far to submit a claim regarding its continental shelf to CLCS. 2° On December 20, 2001, the Russian Federation proposed the outer limits of its continental shelf. 20 7 The Russian claim was for 1.2 million square kilometers of territory, including the North Pole-nearly half 208 of the Arctic Ocean.
In June 2002, CLCS ruled that there was not sufficient data to support the assertion. 2 0 9 CLCS asked the Russian Federation to make a revised submission with respect to its extended continental shelf. 210 Russia has until 2009 to prove its claim, in order to fall within the ten-year time period mandated by CLCS. 2 11 Russia is still in the process of verifying the claim it submitted in 2001.212
The 2007 Russian flag-planting mission was also aimed at proving that the seabed beneath the North Pole, known as the Lomonsov Ridge, is an extension of the Eurasian continental shelf, and thus falls under Russian control.
213 Countering Russia's claim, Canada and Denmark are pursuing scientific proof that Lomonsov Ridge is connected to Ellesmere Island 214 and Greenland respectively. 215 Both Denmark and Canada have coordinated research missions designed to counter the Russian claim to the Lomonosov Ridge. 2 16 Russia is currently regarded as the dominant force in the Arctic. The Russian flag-planting mission, along with its significant claim to the Arctic in 2001, is just one of the ways that Russia is attempting to assert its dominance and intent to exert control over the Arctic. 21 7 Russia is also a dominant force in the Arctic because "it has the world's largest fleet of icebreakers and long experience developing its icy Northern coastline. 21 
C. Denmark and Canada -Hans Island
Denmark and Canada are disputing the sovereignty of Hans Island, "a half-square-mile rock, 13% the size of New York's Central Park," which is located between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Danish Greenland. 1 9 The island has been a subject of silent conflict for more than twenty years. 220 The island is important for several reasons, including: "(1) the possible oil reserves lying beneath it 221 and (2) its location at the center of the Kennedy Channel, a potentially important shipping lane., 222 The resolution of the dispute between Canada and Denmark over the island may have implications for determining each country's continental shelf boundaries under UNCLOS. 223 Also, if Canada subordinates its claim regarding Hans Island, it might lose any leverage it holds with regard to the rest of the Arctic region, including the Northwest Passage. 224 The preceding disputes are only examples of the disputes that are currently ongoing between the Arctic states. The disputes with the most potential to become extremely heated will likely develop due to the lack of an effective and efficient terms resolution mechanism in UNCLOS.
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III. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTION MODELS
There have been several different proposed models that purport to offer a solution to the potential Arctic disputes. 226 None of the proposed solutions are perfect, and each has pros and cons. 227 This Part provides an analysis of several of the previously proposed models. 
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A. Antarctica Model
One of the proposed solutions regarding territory disputes in the Arctic is to implement a treaty between the five countries that is similar to the Antarctic Treaty. 2 28 The two polar areas are similar in many ways. 229 "Both have extreme climatic conditions, receiving less radiation from the sun than other parts of the globe, and the ecosystems have had to adapt to very cold and dark environments with short light-filled growing seasons., 230 The two areas also have many differences. 231 " [T] he Arctic consists of ocean surrounded by continents, whereas the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by ocean; the Antarctic has no permanent human habitation, while the Arctic is inhabited by indigenous peoples and other local communities. ' 232 The Antarctic Treaty was created in 1959 after the United States invited twelve nations with claims to Antarctica to a conference in Washington D.C.
233
The Treaty included key provisions that addressed competing territorial claims. 2 34 Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty includes a clause that states that nothing contained in the Treaty will be interpreted as a renunciation by any Party of a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 235 Article IV also states that no activities that take place while the Treaty is in force will constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, or create any right to sovereignty. 236 No new claims or enlargement of existing claims can be made while the Treaty is in force. 37 The actual effect of this language is unclear, but it is important because it allowed the nations to look past any territorial disputes and focus on other important problems facing the continent, such as pollution control, natural resource exploitation, and scientific exploration. 38 No new sovereignty disputes have arisen in Antarctica for more than forty-five years, mainly due to Article IV.
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Some scholars believe that because there are many piecemeal treaties that do not completely cover all the concerns of the Arctic, a single treaty modeled 230. Id. "In such conditions, the ecosystems are simple, containing only a few key species, and are thus more vulnerable to human-induced pollution than those of more temperate areas." Id. "[T]he two polar regions have four issues in common: science, territorial sovereignty, national security, and environment." Dubner, supra note 37, at 13 (internal quotations omitted).
231. govern.
In the Arctic, national environmental laws apply to most areas. However, the Antarctic Model will most likely not be effective in the Arctic region for several reasons. "[S]cientific interests rather than political, economic, or military concerns dominated the expeditions sent to Antarctica after World War II. ' 244 In contrast, the motivations behind territory claims in the Arctic are based solely on political, economic, and military concerns. 245 "While such a treaty would solve many of the environmental issues in the region, it might not have a strong enough effect on the territorial disputes, and so it might not satisfy all States, some of whom are more concerned with their sovereignty claims than environmental issues. ' 
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B. Environmental Model
There are many different environmental occurrences that would be detrimental to the Arctic region, and the world as a whole, which may be triggered by both the increased temperatures in the Arctic and the increased activity which the area will probably be subject to if temperatures continue to rise. 247 The major concern is that oil exploration in the area will subject the environment to potentially massive oil spills. 248 Common oil rigs, such as the ones in the Gulf of Mexico, are not strong enough to withstand Arctic ice.
249
Therefore, reinforced rigs will be necessary. 250 "Whether even the reinforced rigs survive is a concern for environmentalists, who fear the ice could cause a spill by damaging equipment and make a cleanup next to impossible. here's also a feeling that drilling in the Arctic, made possible largely by global warming at least partially caused by burning fossil fuels, is perverse." Id.
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negative effects on the environment in the Arctic region is to create an international park system encompassing the Arctic Ocean through a comprehensive treaty or other instrument. 5 2 Currently, there are many international world parks which are controlled by more than one state. 253 These parks include: Pico de Neblina, 254 Glacier National Park 255 and adjacent Waterton Lakes National Park, 256 and Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. 2 57 "As part of the Arctic transnational park, the countries bordering the Arctic Ocean could impose a moratorium on resource extrication or development in the ocean ... ,,258 "[T]he international park zone could either parallel the type of arrangement found in the Antarctic or could create an 'authority' to prevent despoliation or development of the Arctic Ocean." 2 59
However, many people have noted that an overriding problem with an international transboundary park is that environmental damage was not a major consideration of the UNCLOS drafters. 260 There is not an effective enforcement mechanism within the treaty to prevent environmental degradation. 2 61 One author claims that an "effective way to achieve the needed enforcement mechanisms is to create an international park., 262 This proposed solution model would also require the cooperation of most, if not all, of the five Arctic states. 263 While this is probably the best solution proposed to preserve the Arctic environment from degradation, many of the involved states may not be able to look past the significant potential gains that will likely come from exploration and exploitation of the Arctic's available 
C. All Nations Ratify UNCLOS
Another proposed resolution to solve Arctic problems is that all involved states ratify UNCLOS.
2 65 While this solution may aid some of the disputes in the region, it is not an adequate resolution in of itself.
266
With 155 signatories, UNCLOS is one of the most adhered-to conventions in the world. 267 The only Arctic state at issue that has not yet ratified the treaty is the United States. 268 Thus, because all of the Arctic states besides the United States are signatories to the treaty, there is little resolution that will come from this that does not currently exist.
The only major benefit regarding the Arctic dispute that may result from the United States becoming a signatory to the treaty would be a possible resolution to the Northwest Passage dispute. 269 "The UNCLOS transit passage regime, in conjunction with Article 234 provides Canada ample jurisdiction to enforce stringent environmental standards commensurate with the risks that exist in Arctic waters.,, 270 Becoming a signatory to UNCLOS would provide the United States guaranteed freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage. 271 "[C]ommercial shipping of the Northwest Passage can consequently be developed without the fear that every transit would be considered a threat to Canadian national security and sovereignty., 272 It is advisable for the United States to become a signatory to UNCLOS in order to extend its continental shelf. 273 It will also help to ensure that the United States will be able to navigate through the Northwest Passage as allowed by Article 234 of UNCLOS. 274 Although U.S. accession to UNCLOS would be beneficial for protecting U.S. interests, accession will not provide a complete resolution of all issues in the area because of the previously outlined uncertainties surrounding CLCS and UNCLOS. 
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All of the previously proposed solutions examined in this Part have one thing in common. 276 [Vol. 19:2 MELTING ICE CAUSING THE ARCTIC TO BoIL OVER scientific work on the limits of the continental shelf in 2003.285 The reason the four states opted for a joint submission was that they determined a joint submission would "permit the sharing of human and technical resources, and costs. ' 286 This approach also reduces the workload of CLCS because it only has to examine one submission rather than four closely related ones. 287 While UNCLOS does not mention joint submissions, the CLCS Rules mention such submissions in sections dealing with disputes between coastal states. 288 The states involved must agree to the joint submission. 289 The joint submission also cannot request delimitation of boundaries between the parties. 290 CLCS makes recommendations based on the submission as a whole, and it is up to the parties involved to delimit individual boundaries between themselves. 29 ' No disputes existed among the parties to the joint submission regarding the extension of the continental shelf into the Bay of Biscay and the Celtic Sea. 292 However, there were unresolved boundaries. 293 The states have asked the Commission to make recommendations on the outer limits of the shelf in the area of convergence first, and propose to subsequently delimit the boundaries among themselves. 294 Utilizing this potential model, some or all of the Arctic states could band together and jointly submit their requests to CLCS. This would allow the states to save considerable resources in the expensive exploration of the ocean floor. 299 A joint submission would permit the sharing of human and technical resources and costs among all the parties to the joint submissioni. 300 Because preparation of a submission to CLCS is a complex, detailed, and timeconsuming venture, the teams preparing the joint submission will likely develop a strong cooperative spirit and common understandings of the issues and challenges involved in the region. 30 1 Hopefully, the spirit and understanding would carry beyond the submission preparation to a stage where the states discuss delimitation of the boundaries among themselves. 30 2 However, there are also potential problems with states collaborating around ajoint submission. First, because Russia has already submitted a claim to CLCS, it will have to make a new or revised claim to CLCS. 3°3 Also, Russia's demonstrated intent to exert a high degree of control over the Arctic may preclude reaching a solution via joint submission that would be satisfactory to all parties. 3 0 4 Additionally, because the most significant aspect of the Arctic dispute relates to territory that can be claimed by more than one of the States in their extended continental shelf, if any area of the joint submission and Russia's submission overlap, there will still be a dispute regarding the overlapping territory. Moreover, this method will also require the cooperation of the parties involved because the CLCS would not provide the delimitation between the states in the joint submission. 3 0 6 It would only delimit the joint submission as a whole.
30 7 Thus, the parties would still have to agree on their individual boundaries among themselves. 30 8 As mentioned previously, it is speculative whether the Arctic states will be able to cooperate regarding a solution to the potential disputes. 3 9
B. Australia and Timor-Leste Maritime Boundary Dispute
In 2006, the governments of Australia and East Timor 3 10 took steps in the for satisfactory resolution of all of the issues involved.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As this Note has demonstrated, it is essential that the Arctic states find a solution to the current and potentially forthcoming disputes before the situation escalates. One overarching principle that emerges from all of the solutions discussed in this Note is that the Arctic nations must cooperate and work 328 together to craft a solution that benefits all of the parties. 2 If the Arctic states are able to reach a mutual agreement, it will likely prevent what are currently inevitable disputes. Also, if the states cooperate with each other, the cooperation will make it possible to implement systems to protect the fragile Arctic environment from degradation, something that would be nearly impossible to achieve without the full cooperation of most if not all of the five
329
Arctic states.
It may be beneficial for the Arctic states to negotiate an agreement between themselves that is independent of UNCLOS. As this Note has shown, UNCLOS does not provide an effective method for dispute resolution between the Arctic states. 33°I n addition, the United States should ratify UNCLOS. If UNCLOS continues to govern Arctic disputes, the United States must ratify the Convention so it may be a party to any potential solutions and secure any potential claim for an extended continental shelf to CLCS.
3 3 1 Even if the Arctic states negotiate an agreement outside of UNCLOS, the United States' ratification of UNCLOS will still protect its oceanic interests in other areas. 332 In summary, in order to avoid a long and heated battle over territory, the Arctic states must learn to cooperate with one another and reach a mutual agreement regarding the use of the Arctic area. The ineffectiveness of UNCLOS makes cooperation between the Arctic states necessary. 333 A new agreement outside of UNCLOS would be the most effective way for the Arctic states to develop a mutually beneficial solution for all. To reach this solution, the states must balance the economic interests involved in the claims to territory with the environmental and sovereignty concerns.
